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Nelson: Survival of Actions in Montana

NOTE AND COMMENT
SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS IN MONTANA
Actio personalis moritur cum persona is a maxim which
reaches back far into English jurisprudence. Translated it means
personal actions die with the person. The reasoning which supports it is "one of the least rational parts of our law."' It has
no champion at this date, nor has any judge or law writer risen
to defend it for two hundred years.' Actions ex contractu were
conceived as not within the sweep of the principle, but ex delicto actions, involving injuries to the person, were. In the early
common law the thought was that private suits for personal
wrongs were in the nature of punitive recoveries, vindictive,
which should not be prosecuted against the personal representatives who had no hand in the tort.' The merit of the claim
against the wrongdoer seemed not to occupy attention.
Later statutes alleviated the harsh rule. In 1330 a statute'
gave executors authority to sue for damages for their decedent's

chattels asported in his lifetime. Again in 1833' a remedy for
injuries to decedent's real estate was enacted, and this worked
the other way as well, for the deceased wrongdoer's estate was
liable for his acts against another's property committed within
six months of his death. The emphasis was on property interests. Personal actions were still governed by the Latin phrase.
Blackstone' suggested in 1770 that since the personal representatives of the plaintiff received no benefit and those of the defendant committed no wrong, the action should abate. Ex contractu actions were in the nature of property which descended
'PoLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS, (12th ed. 1923) p. 60.
'Harris v. Nashville Trust Co. (1914) 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584,
49' L. R. A. (N. S.) 897, Ann. Cas. 1914C 885.
'POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS, p. 61.

'4 ED. III, c. 7.
53 & 4 WiLL IV, c. 42.

Traces of this statute and that referred to in

aupra note 4, appear in Montana's Probate Code, §§10258, 10259, 10260,

R. C. M. 1935.
'III BLAcKsToNE's COMMENTARIES 302 (Chapter 20): "...Or,
it
may be, that the plaintiff is dead, for the death of either party is at
once an abatement of the suit. And in actions merely personal, arising em delicto, for wrongs actually done or committed by the defendant,
as trespass, battery, and slander, the rule is that actio personalis
moritur cum persona;and it never shall be revived either by or against
the executors or other representatives. For neither the executors of
the plaintiff have received, nor those of the defendant have committed,
in their own personal capacity, any manner of wrong or injury. But
actions arising ex contractu, by breach of promise and the like, where
the right descends to the representatives of the plaintiff, and those of
the defendant have assets to answer the demand, though the suits shall
abate by the death of the parties, yet they may be revived against or
by the executors: being indeed rather actions against the property
than the person, in which the executors have now the same interest
that their testator had before."
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to the personal representative, and they survived. The test
seemed to be whether property rights were affected as distinguished from merely personal interests." Assignability of the
cause of action has been urged as the criterion."
The injustice of the maxim brought about Lord Campbell's
Act.' Passed in 1846, it gave to the deceased's personal representative the right to sue the person whose wrongful act, neglect
or default caused the death of the party. Proceeds were for the
benefit of the deceased's family. Similar legislation has been
enacted in most American jurisdictions. We have it in Montana." There is properly no question of survival under this
type of statute, for it confers a new cause of action.
The prime inquiry here is as to causes of action which had
existence before the party's death. Unless saved by statute,
such actions come under the common law rule and are subject to
actio personalis. The appropriate statute on general survival in
Montana is Section 9086, R. C. M. 1935:
"An action, or cause of action, or defense, shall not
abate by death, or other disability of a party, or by the
transfer of any interest therein, but shall in all cases, where
a cause of action or defense arose in favor of such party
prior to his death or other disability, or transfer of interest
therein, survive, and be maintained by his representatives
or successors in interest; and in case such action has not
been begun or defense interposed, the action may be begun
or defense set up in the name of his representatives or successors in interest; and in case the action has been begun or
defense set up, the court shall, on motion, allow the action
or proceeding to be continued by or against his represent'Jenkins v. French (1879) 58 N. H. 532; Boor v. Lowrey (1885) 103
Ind. 468, 3 N. E. 151, 53 Am Rep. 519; Sullivan v. Associated Billposters (1925) 6 F. (2d) 1000, 42 A. L. R. 503.
'See 1 C. J. 174, §303; 1 C. J. S. 179, §132.
'9 & 10 VIc., c. 93.
§9076, R. C. M. 1935: "When the death of one person, not being a
minor, is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs or
personal representatives may maintain an action for damages against
the person causing the death, or if such person be employed by another
person who is responsible for his conduct, then also against such other
person. In every action under this and the preceding section,. such
damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may
be just."
§9075, R. C. M. 1935: "A father, or in case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother, may maintain an action for the injury
or death of a minor child, and a guardian for injury or death of his
ward, when such injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another. Such action may be maintained against the person
causing the injury or death, or if such person be employed by another
person who Is responsible for his conduct, also against such other

person."
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atives or successors in interest. In case of any transfer of
interest, the action or proceeding may be continued in the
name of the original party, or the court may allow the person to whom the transfer is made to be substituted in the
action or proceeding."
The history of Montana's survival statute shows it to have been
taken from California, and it retained the California language"
until 1883 when the present law was enacted." American jurisdictions have varying survival statutes not susceptible of
clear-cut classification." A summary" breaks up the statutes
into four groups. In five states," only injuries to tangible
property survive. Fifteen states" allow survival of all causes
except personal injuries. Twenty two" provide for survival of
actions "for injury to the person," but this means physical injuries only and not the intangible interests of personality. The
law of six states' grants survival to all causes of action. Montana's broad statute places her in the fourth group where all
causes survive.
Lavell v. Frost" is apparently the first Montana case involving survival. The action had been instituted before the
death of the defendant and the court applied the rule as set out
"CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, §385 (Deering 1937) :

"An action or

proceeding does not abate by the death, or any disability of a party,
or by the transfer of any interest therein, if the cause of action survive or continue ....

Note the wording,

"

.

.

. if the cause of action

survive or continue .... " Interpretation by California courts has
been that the statute does not purport to change the common law rule
that death abates personal actions. A line of authority commencing
with Clark v. Goodwin (1915) 170 Cal. 527, 150 P. 357, LRA 1916A
1142, down to Gosling v. Nichols (1943) ...... Cal ........ 139 P. (2d) 86,

sustains the view. Accordingly, in California the heirs or personal representatives may sue the living tortfeasor under the analogue of Lord
Campbell's Act, but may not sue the tortfeasor's estate after his death.
"Modification of language occurred in 1895 by the enactment of §587

Code of Civil Procedure, but the change was slight and dealt with

omission of the word "marriage."
"Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort Claims
for and against Executors and Administrators, 29 MIcH. L. REV. 969,

(1931).

"Inadequacies of English and State Survival Legislation, 48 HARV. L.

REV. 1008, (1935).
"Alabama, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee.
"Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho,

Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Utah,
West Virginia, Wyoming.
"Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kansas,

Kentucky,

Maine,

Maryland,

Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin.
"Connecticut, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire.
"(1895) 16 Mont. 93, 40 P. 146.
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in Section 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure:' "An action or
defense shall not abate by the death of the party, but shall survive and be maintained by his representatives." This is apparently an abridgment of the original statute more fully set out
above. Lynde v. Wakefield,' decided the next year, raised the
question of the right of a widow's personal representative to
have dower assigned. The court quoted the statute at length
and concluded that the common law would refuse the administrator this action,

"

....

But we think under our statute, and

the great weight of authority, a different rule prevails in equity." In Melzner v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.' an interpretation more extensive than equity adjudications was put upon the
statute from a historical review of the legislation. Tort claims
as well as others were deemed within the statute. There the administrator sued on the last clear chance theory for personal injuries to his decedent, and the objection was that the parent
should bring the action under (now) Section 9075, R. C. M.
1935. The court held the complaint disclosed a cause of action
in decedent at his death upon which the plaintiff administrator
was suing."
Dillon v. Great Northern Ry. Co." was an action by the widow in her own right and as guardian of her minor children
against the employer of her husband who was killed in a train
accident. Decedent did not live a second of time after the crash.
In holding the railroad not liable, the court observed that "...
the wrong and the death being coincident in point of time, the
instant the wrong is committed the victim of the wrong has
ceased to exist, and it seems impossible that there is any cause
of action in favor of such victim." Here there was dictum that
a cause of action cannot exist in favor of a deceased person. By
that surely is meant that after death no personal actions can
arise. Different is the cause of action arising during the life
of deceased which is preserved by virtue of statute.
A survival point arose in Johnson v. Butte & Superior Copper Co.,' namely, whether a common law action could be carried
'COMPILED

'(1896)
'(1912)

STATUTES OF MONTANA,

19 Mont. 23, 47 P. 5.
46 Mont. 162, 127 P. 146.

FIRST DIvISION,

1887.

2'In wrongful death cases importance is attached to the fact of survival
of deceased for an appreciable length of time. If death is instantaneous, no cause of action arises and there is nothing to survive. Dillon v. Great Northern By. Co. (1909) 38 Mont. 485, 100 P. 960; Chicago M. & S. P. Ry. Co. v. Clement (C. C. A. 9th 1915) 226 F. 426;
see Burns v. Eminger (1927) 81 Mont. 79, 261 P. 613; Melzner v.
Northern Pac. Ry. supra note 22.
2(1909) 38 Mont. 485, 100 P. 960.
'(1910) 41 Mont. 158, 108 P. 1057, 48 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 938.
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forward by the administrator of deceased. The injury to the
workman resulted in death, and a statute" took away the defense of contributory negligence from the mine owner. Liability was fastened on the defendant because the action accrued to
the party injured and remained available to him until the instant of his death. Expressly left undecided was the question
whether the heirs of deceased could maintain an action under
our equivalent of Lord Campbell's Act.
Melville v. Butte-Balaklava Copper Co." illustrates a survival distinction. The plaintiffs were the widow and minor
children of deceased who was killed in a mine accident in which
his own negligence figured. Pleading under (now) Section
9076, R. C. M. 1935, which gives a cause of action to heirs or
personal representatives for the wrongful death of a person not
a minor, plaintiffs urged that defenses did not apply to them.
The court defined "wrongful act or neglect of another" to mean
wrongful as against the deceased, not as to the heirs. If fault
lay in the injured party's conduct to deprive him of recovery,
so it was with his heirs or personal representatives. They claim
under him. Maronen v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co." put the
question in these terms: Would the same facts, if stated by the
injured man, constitute a cause of action in his behalf? If so,
the action could be carried forward.
A liability imposed by statute was sought to be enforced
against the estate of a deceased director in First National Bank
v. Cottonwood Land Co." The court held that " . . . the cause
of action survives the death of the party in the wrong as well
as the death of the one whose rights are infringed." Here is
the suggestion that the survival statute works both ways. This
was not a personal action in the sense we have been using the
term. The action affects property rights and hence conceivably
could survive under statutes less broad than ours.
Breach of promise to marry' has long been cited to exemplify the typical personal action which dies with the person. It
is damage to intangible interests that is sought to be recovered
"Ch. 23, §1,
M(

19 13 )

LAWS OF MONTANA

47 Mont. 1, 130 P. 441.

1905, now §7763, R. C. M. 1935.

(1913) 48 Mont. 249, 136 P. 968.
"(1916) 51 Mont. 544, 154 P. 582.
'°Courts examine the substance of the cause of action without regard
to the form in which it is cast. Breach of promise to marry is tort
more than contract, the agreement affects persons not property, it is
not assignable. The measure of damages will include considerations
for the plaintiff's character, social standing and chastity. In Warner
v. Benham (1923) 126 Wash. 393, 218 P. 260, 34 A. L. R. 1358, suit for
breach of promise to marry was held not to survive under the Probate
Code which provided for survival of actions based upon contract.
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for. Property rights are not affected. The Montana court had
opportunty to pass directly on the question as influenced by
Section 9086. It held in Kennedy v. Rogan" that such action
survived. There was no doubt now that Montana's statute was
a general survival law operating both in favor of and against
the estate even in torts most personal in character.
Bruce v. McAdoo' involved survival and Workmen's Compensation. A defective brake on a railroad car being moved in
the yard of the coal company caused the car to stop abruptly and
precipitated the deceased from the car to the ground. His employer and the worker were covered by the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, and admittedly a settlement had
been made. The action was against the Director-General of
Railroads for negligence in providing defective equipment. Provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act were held to be exclusive; and unless the wrongful act occurred off the premises
of the employer there could be no action against a third party
for his negligence. The suggestion in this case was that if an
independent action under the survival statute were to be given,
it was the legislature's business to provide it.'
In Anderson v. Wirkmane defendant's intestate shot and
killed L. 0. B. Anderson and then committed suicide. Heirs of
Anderson presented a claim against the estate of the murderer
and it was rejected. Suit for damages ensued. The court held
that Section 9076 authorized the suit and our survival statute
preserved the action against the wrongdoer's estate. Defendant
contended for a narrow construction of Section 9086 since survival of a cause of action against a tortfeasor was not in words
provided for. Invoked also was the argument that this statute
in derogation of the common law was to be strictly construed.
The holding adhered to views expressed in former cases and the
argument was not accepted.
The facts in the two Burns v. Eminger' cases were the
same. The father as administrator sued for the death. of his
minor son who was run into by the servant of defendant. Seven hours later the boy died. Recovery in the first was for
$1500 on a cause of action arising in the child's favor before
his death. $2500 was recovered in the action prosecuted under
the authority of Section 9075, and here the plaintiff sued in his
'(1916) 52 Mont. 242, 156 P. 1078.
'(1922) 65 Mont. 275, 211 P. 772.
'Finally in 1933 such a remedy was provided in Ch. 138, LAws 0F
MONTANA 1933, carried into R. C. M. 1935 as §2839. See Toelle, Workmen's Compensation in Montana, 1 MONT. L. REV. 5, 30.
"(1923) 67 Mont. 176, 215 P. 224.
'(1927) 81 Mont. 79. 261 P. 613; (1929) 84 Mont. 397, 276 P. 437.
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capacity as parent. Said the court, "In the case of an injury
to a minor, there arise two causes of action---one in favor of the
minor, the other in favor of the parents for loss of services during minority." Res adjudicatamay not be pleaded in the second action since the character of the plaintiff has changed.
A county commissioner was charged with collecting illegal
fees in State v. Russell." From a judgment of conviction and
removal from office an appeal was taken, but the death of the
commissioner intervened. It was argued the action abated.
The court heard the appeal and reversed the judgment. "While
it is true that Russell cannot be reinstated, his right to the per
diem and mileage in dispute and giving rise to the charge of
illegal collection, as well as to emoluments accruing to him between the date of his removal and his death, depends upon the
validity of the judgment." Actions penal in nature are the one
class which are held not to survive. Here of course a property
right is affected. On that basis the survival rested.
What is the measure of damages under our survival statute?
The Dillon Case" in obiter suggests as the applicable standard
what would have been proper had the decedent lived and sued.
Compensation for mental and physical pain and suffering, for
medical attention, for loss of time and for decreased earning capacity presumably would be allowed. To be carefully . distinguished is the recovery under our Lord Campbell's Act." Damages there are measured by the loss which the kindred sustain.
Elements recoverable are the portion of deceased's earnings that
would have come to them had deceased lived, plus possibly loss
of companionship.' Furthermore, what is recovered by virtue
of Lord Campbell's Act is not a part of decedent's estate. The
proceeds are for the benefit of the heirs and the administrator
acts as a trustee for them." Exemplary damages are allowed
under this section provided the actionable negligence is that of
the defendant and not that of his servant.'
Interesting is the conflicts of law question presented where
the cause of action arises in a jurisdiction with a broad survival
statute and is sued upon where by the law of the forum the
(1929) 84 Mont. 61, 274 P. 148.
"Dillon v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1909) 38 Mont. 485, 100 P. 960.
'The statute (§9076, R. C. M. 1935) directs that such damages may be
given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just. For
measure of damages in all states, see note, McCoRMIcK ON DAMAGES
(1935) p. 366.
"Recovery for the loss of companionship was specifically recognized in
Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co. (1909) 38 Mont. 521, 100
P. 971, 129 Am. St. Rep. 659, 16 Ann. Cas. 1189.
"Batchoff v. Butte Pacific Copper Co. (1921) 60 Mont. 179, 198 P. 132.
"'Olsen v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co. (1907) 35 Mont. 400, 89 P. 731.
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action does not survive. Contractual actions give little trouble
since their survivability is well nigh universal. Actions for
death by wrongful act may well be litigious. In the days of
swift automobile travel the wrongdoer is here today and gone
tomorrow. Both wronged and wrongdoer may perish in the
same accident. Suit against the estate of the party in fault may
be in the courts of another state. Lord Campbell's Act presents
the beneficiaries with the cause of action. The survival statute,
if general, carries it forward against the estate of the tortfeasor.
The plaintiff in Muir v. Kessinger' was injured in Montana
through the alleged negligence of defendant's intestate who died
as a result of the accident. Plaintiff's claim against the estate
of the deceased in Washington was rejected. By Montana's Section 9086, the action survived against the estate. In Washington, the narrow common law survival rule applied." Holding
that the procedural machinery through which the plaintiff acted
was not adequate to receive a tort claim of this nature," the
court found for the defendant. "This is not because the tort
does not survive in Montana, but the claim is excluded from
claims which may be pressed by suit against the estate. A State
may decline a remedy in its Courts upon a tort arising in another jurisdiction." The anomaly of success in one state and defeat
in another is a part of the price of our federal system.
Progress away from the common law actio personalis rule
has been slow. From the original Acts which saved actions in
favor of the plaintiff as to real and personal property, the
growth of the law has carried with it expanding doctrines, aided
by statutes, which preserve actions in favor of and against both
parties, and this to the extent 'of actions most personal in character. Common sense tells us that the exigency of plaintiff's
or defendant's death should not forfeit the cause of action. Better it is to let the distributees of a tortfeasor's estate claim a less
generous share than to deny relief to the party harmed. Compensation for a wrong done is the philosophy which should prevail. Exemplary damages are given in certain actions in addition to compensatory damages. They are assessed for the purpose of "visiting a punishment upon the defendant and not as a
"(1940)

35 F. Supp. 116.

"REM. REv. STAT. §193, §967, have been interpreted to mean only actions

which survived at common law survive under these sections.
"REM. Rav. STAT. §1520. Actions on Torts of Decedent. "Any person,
or his personal representatives, shall have an action against the executor or administrator of any estate or intestate who in his lifetime
shall have wasted, destroyed, taken, or carried away, or converted to
his own use, the goods and chattels of any such person, or committed
any trespass on the real estate of such person."
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measure of any loss or detriment of the plaintiff."' Accordingly, when an action under the survival statute is against the
living tortfeasor, and the case is one where exemplary damages
are otherwise appropriate, they may well be awarded. If, however, the tortfeasor is dead, no social interest can be served by
holding his estate liable for punitive damages.
The vitality which actio personalis exhibits can be impaired
only by statute, for already noted are its strong common law
roots. Language as general as that in Section 9086 and interpretations as broad as Montana's are necessary to achieve the
desired result. It is believed that our general survival statute
merits wider initiation and adoption.
-James A. Nelson.
TEMPORARY ALIMONY IN A SUIT FOR ABSOLUTE
DIVORCE-MONTANA
The doctrine of alimony is a necessary consequence of the
legal relations between husband and wife.
At common law it appears that the husband became
seized, during coverture, of a freehold estate in all the lands
in which his wife had an estate of inheritance, with control of
such property.' All personal property in her possession at
marriage, or which came to her during coverture, vested absolutely in the husband.' In return, the law cast on the husband the duty of maintaining his wife according to his ability
and condition in life.'
Temporary alimony and suit money were regularly granted by the ecclesiastical courts to a wife, defendant as well as
plaintiff in a suit for divorce, on showing of marriage, if she
were really in need, and had probable grounds for her success in the action.' The natural result of the legal investiture
of the husband with his wife's property was that the wife was
generally in need! "If the woman's ante-nuptial money has
practically vested in the man and is in his pocket, so that without the order of the court she can obtain control of none of it,
her claim to what will enable her to live and carry on the lit(1935) §77, p. 275.
'30 C. J., Husband and Wife, p. 526, §42; see also 26 AM. Jun., Husband and Wife, p. 684, §55.
'30 C. J., Husband and Wife, p. 528, §47; see also 26 AM. Jui', Husband and Wife, p. 684, §55.
'30 C. J., Husband and Wife, p. 530, §50; see also 26 AM. Jun., Husband and Wife, p. 685, §57.
'II, BisHcP, MARRIAGE & DxvoRCE (6th Ed.), p. 318, §369.

"MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES

'II, VERNim,

AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS,. p. 309, §110.
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